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Abstract 
The literature largely advocates for community participation in heritage tourism 
planning but there is little empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
participatory management and its contribution to heritage. This study adopts an 
experimental approach to conduct a ceteris paribus comparison between 
participatory and non-participatory decision-making. The analysis relies on 
behavioural data on choices, deliberation and conflict studied in the context of 
a controlled collaborative environment. The findings provide important insights 
in favour of participation, offering support to previous conjectures. First, choices 
and deliberation between participatory and non-participatory groups exhibit no 
statistically significant differences, suggesting that community participation can 
be (equally?) as effective as (with) top-down decision-making. Second, 
participatory groups are more susceptible to conflict, which is nonetheless 
constructive rather than destructive, leading to more pro-heritage choices. 
Further, in participatory groups, we find positive correlations between pro-
heritage preferences and deliberation, suggesting that the latter benefits 
heritage investment decisions. These findings have important implications, 
arguing for collaborative approaches to heritage tourism planning and less 
institutional anxiety towards conflict. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper investigates participatory heritage tourism adopting an experimental 
economics approach, which introduces an important line of research in tourism 
development policy. Contrary to previous work and instead of assessing the 
effects of a participatory exercise per se, we test ceteris paribus community 
participation in heritage tourism decision-making against non-participation.   
Heritage tourism is special-interest tourism, driven by an appreciation and 
engagement with elements of the past, such as archaeological sites, local 
architecture, museum exhibitions, folk arts and traditions that witness the 
cultural legacy of destinations (Timothy & Boyd, 2006). The ‘heritagisation’ of 
the tourism product is increasingly recognised as a means of enhancing 
destination attractiveness, especially in rural areas, while preserving heritage 
capital (Antonakakis et al., 2015; Bessiere, 2013; Wu et al., 2015). 
Nonetheless, quality development of heritage tourism entails substantial 
investment in the conservation and promotion of heritage assets and a 
departure from more conventional tourism activities. In parallel, it necessitates 
the consent of host communities and their positive attitude towards the sector’s 
growth and direction, which could be better achieved through their involvement 
in tourism planning (Nunkoo & Ramkinsson, 2011; Reggers et al., 2016). 
 
Community participation in tourism and heritage 
Although the concept of community involvement or participation in tourism 
was introduced more than three decades ago (Getz, 1983; Murphy, 1985), it 
still remains a topical issue in tourism and sustainable development studies. 
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Relevant scholarly work acknowledges community stakeholders, such as local 
residents and entrepreneurs, as potential partners who deserve an active role 
not only in tourism trade (Saufi et al., 2014; Ruiz-Ballesteros et al., 2016) but 
also in the strategic design and decision-making for tourism growth (Wray, 
2011; Marzuki et al., 2012; Cohen-Hattab, 2013). The advocates of community 
participation argue that such policymaking approach can increase trust and 
public consensus (Byrd, 2007; Vargas-Sanchez et al., 2010), lead to tourism 
strategies that correspond to local needs (Currie et al., 2009) and contribute to 
destination sustainability (Byrd et al., 2009; Ooi et al., 2015).  
Community participation is also emphasised in the context of heritage and 
heritage tourism planning (see for instance, Den, 2014; Su & Wall, 2014; 
Mansfeld, 2015). Heritage management theorists propose that decisions 
concerning heritage sites need to involve all interested parties to accommodate 
their values and positions (Fouseki, 2015). At the same time, world-leading 
specialised agencies propose a heritage tourism paradigm where local needs 
are pursued through both bottom-up and top-down measures (UNESCO, 2012) 
and destination communities are involved in the design of conservation and 
tourism strategies (ICOMOS, 1999). 
 
The problem 
Despite the growing consensus over community participation amongst 
academics and specialists, the top-down linear approach to decision-making 
still remains the prevailing paradigm for heritage tourism planning (Su & Wall, 
2014). Community input tends to be marginalised and largely confined to public 
consultation with no guarantee of shaping action policy (Spencer, 2010; 
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Marzuki et al., 2012). This creates a paradox between the abundance of 
scholarly work in favour of participation and the limited empirical knowledge of 
its application.  
Such disproportion between theory and hands-on evidence encourages 
scepticism and dissuades from tackling the political, socio-cultural and practical 
complexities of pursuing participatory decision-making. For instance, it is hard 
to claim convincingly based solely on theoretical constructs that community-led 
decisions can benefit heritage or that economically deprived societies would 
not ‘discount the future’, as Redcliff (2005, p.215) puts it, by opting for some 
quick-fix economic solution at the expense of long-term cultural and socio-
economic sustainability. 
Therefore, it is vital to explore the feasibility of participation further and 
provide more evidence that the concept is not ‘idealistic’ but applicable to a 
natural context. Such evidence is critical for incentivising policymakers to 
address the challenges of participation and for reducing scepticism about its 
outcomes and effectiveness. In addition, given the inevitable presence of 
conflicting stakeholder interests and institutional anxiety of a more inclusive 
decision-making process, it is necessary to examine more systematically the 
degree to which conflict may affect the process and outcomes of participatory 
tourism planning. 
Although it is important to address these long-posed questions, there are 
some inherent complications of doing so empirically. The limited naturally 
occurring data renders it particularly difficult to observe the effect of community 
participation in heritage tourism planning or assess the counterfactuals of 
participatory decision-making in destination development. In consequence, 
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tourism research examining the effectiveness of participatory structures is quite 
fragmented, with relevant studies more commonly adopting a case-study 
enquiry of outcomes in destinations where some form of community 
participation was empowered or pursued (see inter alia Aas et al., 2005; Vernon 
et al., 2005; Byrd, 2007; Beaumont & Dredge, 2010; Spencer, 2010; Jamal and 
McDonald, 2011; Waligo et al., 2013; Reggers et al., 2016). These studies 
employ a mix of qualitative tools (e.g. interviews, focus groups or ethnographic 
approaches, such as meetings’ attendance) with quantitative surveys. 
However, these approaches are valuable for an ex-post assessment, without 
possibility of comparing participatory management to the counterfactuals.  
 
The solution 
Contrary to previous work, we adopt an experimental approach designed to 
study the process and outcomes resulting from participatory and non-
participatory management in a controlled way. Based on our design, non-
participatory groups reflect conventional planning approaches where decisions 
are led exclusively by state heritage professionals and government authorities. 
Rather, participatory groups are of mixed structure with broader community 
representatives (e.g. local residents and tourism professionals) and instructed 
to make decisions collaboratively. The examination of both structures allows us 
to identify and directly compare ex-ante any potential benefits or costs of active 
community involvement in tourism planning with its counterfactual course of 
action, in destinations with no prior participatory experience.  
The distinction of experimental research as opposed to other methodological 
approaches, such as observational tools, is that it randomly assigns human 
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subjects to various conditions (i.e. treatments) and compares their behaviour 
against control or other treatment groups (Druckman et al., 2011). Hence, the 
experimental approach renders it possible to observe community behaviour 
and test the efficiency of participatory tourism planning in any destination by 
staging participatory conditions and exposing communities to them. Economic 
experiments are well-established tools for examining social behaviour 
(Exadaktylos et al., 2013) and exploring policy issues (Croson, 2003). Thus, 
our enquiry adopts and adapts their tools with the view to extend the scope of 
research in participatory tourism and shed some light into this challenging topic 
that can inform heritage tourism policy. 
The aim of the study is to examine and compare the effectiveness of 
community participation with top-down heritage tourism planning and their 
contribution to pro-heritage investment decisions. To do so, it employs an 
experimental methodological framework at the field that seeks to expose 
subjects to collective decision-making with the view to reveal potential trade-
offs between self (group) and public (heritage) interests under realistic 
circumstances. We recruit non-participatory, grassroots and participatory 
(mixed) groups and we observe any behavioural differences accordingly. Our 
findings provide some experimental evidence in favour of participatory heritage 
tourism planning and thus lean support to the theoretical literature.  
 
2. Background of study 
 
Conceptual framework 
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Our theoretical premise for applying an experimental methodology to the 
context of participatory heritage tourism planning is on the one hand, the public 
good qualities of heritage and on the other, the relevance of social preferences 
to the decision making process regarding public goods. As heritage bears the 
non-excludable and non-rival features of public goods, heritage assets have 
long been defined as public or quasi-public goods (see, for instance, Navrud & 
Ready, 2002) as even in cases where access to them is restricted (e.g. listed 
buildings used as private residencies) or conditional (i.e. admission charges) 
there are still consumption elements that cannot be controlled, such as 
aesthetic pleasure.  
Public goods can be enjoyed by all society and provide community-shared 
benefits. It follows that any investment in public goods affects positively anyone 
that uses these goods or intends to do so in the future. In turn, the public good 
nature of heritage assets suggests that any contribution to their preservation or 
promotion is independent from their consumption. Hence, when it comes to 
tourism development, (public) investment in heritage could create communal 
benefits, however the most ‘visible’ gains would be those shared amongst 
visitors and tourism stakeholders. For those not involved in tourism trade the 
benefits might seem too indirect (e.g. economic gains from the injection of 
tourism income into the local economy) or too intangible (e.g. scientific value or 
sense of identity and pride). 
According to the theory, the separation of investment and its returns may 
give rise to social dilemmas, where selfish behaviour is seemingly the best 
course of action, promising the highest (personal) gains which are nonetheless 
subject to either others’ altruism (public goods dilemma) or the ephemerality of 
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collective non-cooperation (commons dilemma). Otherwise, anti-social 
behaviour leads to the good’s degradation or depletion and to subsequent 
communal costs.  
We hold that such dilemmas are highly relevant to participatory heritage 
tourism planning. This is because the development of heritage tourism requires 
substantial financial (public) investment and the support of both policymakers 
and destination hosts for its long-term viability. Thus, it is worth examining 
whether community involvement can act as a driving factor for cooperation and 
encourage pro-heritage investments. Especially when the community in 
question suffers from economic depression, such enquiry is critical given that 
opportunity costs could further influence the balance between altruistic and 
selfish motivations in favour of the latter.  
 
Study context  
Even though the vast majority of economic experiments are laboratory-based 
(Exadaktylos et al., 2013), there are several examples of experiments 
conducted in the field (see for instance Cardenas, 2004; Cardenas & Ostrom, 
2004; Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). Similar to the latter, this study applies a 
quasi-field experimental methodology to a natural context (destination). The 
quasi-field design allows for maintaining some control over subjects’ exposure 
to treatments, which is necessary for testing participatory against non-
participatory behaviour by controlling group synthesis (i.e. distinguishing 
subjects based on their capacity as current policymakers or wider community). 
Given that we are interested in heritage tourism, our enquiry is positioned to 
a destination where such development is highly relevant for stimulating 
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economic growth while increasing incentives for safeguarding local heritage. 
On this basis, the context of our study is the prefecture of Kastoria, a peripheral 
area in the northern peninsular mainland of Greece. Kastoria fits well with our 
criteria as it has currently a heavily depressed economy, reflected by its 30.8% 
unemployment rate (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2016), and a rich but fragile 
heritage capital, manifested by the inclusion of its historic centre in Europa 
Nostra list of the ‘7 Most Endangered Heritage Sites in Europe’ (Council of 
Europe Development Bank, 2015).  
As a destination, Kastoria has a fairly established tourism sector of 
approximately 1,900-bed capacity, which is presently peripheral to its economy 
(Hellenic Chamber of Hotels, 2016). Following the prevailing model of (mass 
organised) tourism in Greece, Kastoria developed a tourism offer, which is 
mostly standardised and mainly consumed domestically. However, as recent 
years witnessed a decline of its local traditional industries (manufacturing) and 
a national on-going economic crisis, opportunities emerged for developing its 
tourism further. Considering Greece’s homogeneity and shortfall in special 
interest tourism (Tsartas et al., 2014), Kastoria could develop a local 
differentiated heritage tourism product to increase its attractiveness and 
competitiveness. Based on its rich heritage collection of prehistoric, classical, 
medieval and modern sites of interest, it could capitalise on heritage tourism to 
stimulate its rural economy and encourage investment in local heritage assets.  
Nevertheless, investing in heritage is costly, whereas building a viable and 
lucrative heritage tourism sector would bear its fruits in the long run at the 
expense of other more directly profitable options. These opportunity costs, 
coupled with the economic predicament of both Kastoria and wider Greece 
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during the study period, increase the magnitude of decisions and the dilemma 
of sharing decision-making control with multiple stakeholders.  
In terms of prior knowledge, the community of Kastoria has very little 
experience of collaborative decision-making. This is due to the country’s 
general political culture and especially for heritage, the hegemony of the state 
archaeological service over heritage management. The latter and its local 
branches are the leading agents for the formulation and execution of heritage-
related planning, often in collaboration with other government authorities (e.g. 
city councils) but autonomously from non-governmental bodies and the public. 
Overall, considering its economic structure, heritage stature and policy 
culture, it is evident that Kastoria presents several challenges in which 
participation in heritage tourism planning is worth being explored. The 
experiment is carried out in a destination where an actual community with real 
stakes in heritage tourism development can be mobilised and tasked to act 
collaboratively. Further, this exploration allows for a ceteris paribus comparison 
with non-participation, where decisions are made exclusively by current power-
holders, in the same controlled setting. 
 
 
3. Research hypotheses 
In social dilemma experimental settings, social welfare renders its 
dependency on subjects’ decisions. Economic experiments feature tasks with 
monetary payments in order to establish a direct link between desired and 
decided outcomes while ensuring internal validity (Zizzo, 2010). In particular, 
economic experiments use a voluntary contributions mechanism, where 
 12 
participants are assigned an endowment and undertake a simple allocation task 
between two accounts; the one representing social/public good contributions 
while the other private contributions (Brandts & Fatas, 2012). Money allocated 
to the private account are secured but fixed (i.e. no additional returns), whereas 
endowments spent on the public good are expected to create collective 
benefits, depending on others’ decisions.  
This voluntary contributions mechanism is a standard tool for exploring 
intrinsic incentives to act against ‘rational’ profit maximisation (Brandts & 
Schram, 2008). These incentives are determined by subjects’ beliefs, interests 
and feelings (van Winden et al., 2008). However, given that this methodological 
technique is used to community participation for the first time, we need to verify 
the applicability of incentive compatible rewards on subjects’ behaviour. For 
this reason, we employ both hypothetical and real monetary rewards to mimic 
the natural context and report any differences in our results accordingly. Thus 
our first hypothesis (H1) concerns the suitability of our method to this particular 
study context and is expressed as follows: 
 
H1. Incentive-compatible rewards, as opposed to hypothetical monetary 
rewards, alter subjects’ behaviour in terms of group contributions and/or 
deliberation time and/or conflict. 
 
As analysed in the introduction, tourism literature suggests that community 
participation improves planning legitimacy and leads to decisions that reflect 
local needs and values to a greater degree. Based on this premise, it is vital to 
further explore whether decisions made by participatory groups with wider 
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community representation would also benefit the future of heritage tourism by 
encouraging pro-heritage investments to a higher or lower degree than 
conventional decision-making. In other words, it is necessary to establish 
whether the wider community shares the same values with traditional 
policymakers and shows an equal sensitivity towards heritage as compared to 
state-employed heritage managers and experts in the field. This prompts us to 
test a second hypothesis (H2) that concentrates on the practical outcomes of 
participation in heritage tourism: 
 
H2. Compared to non-participatory decision-making, community participation 
does not affect heritage tourism negatively in terms of investment choices. 
 
Furthermore, as collected data needs to accommodate the democratic 
functioning of policy-making, participants should be instructed to arrive at a 
collective consensual decision after discussing specific investment scenarios 
and potential alternatives (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). Although deliberation 
holds the potential of exposing decision-making to diverse values that exist 
across a locality (Lo, 2013; Rodriguez-Labajos & Martinez-Alier, 2013), 
contested opinions within a group may give rise to conflict.  
It is thus worth examining whether a participatory decision-making system 
would be more susceptible to conflict due to its higher and more direct 
representation of interests. More important though is to identify the effect of 
conflict on decisions, i.e. whether anti-heritage behaviour prevails over pro-
heritage choices or the opposite. Given the limited empirical evidence on the 
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subject, our third hypothesis (H3) would test the worst-case scenario that is the 
following: 
 
H3. Community participation gives rise to more conflict compared to non-
participation, which in turn influences planning decisions negatively (i.e. leads 
to anti-heritage choices). 
 
Parallel to the outcomes of participation on planning choices, it is also worth 
considering the effects of participation on the decision-making process. 
Previous experimental work has associated intuitive thinking to shorter decision 
times and less pro-social decisions on the premise that pro-social choices 
trigger (internal) conflict (Rubinstein, 2007; Piovesan & Wengstrom, 2009). Yet, 
it is worth exploring whether such findings are extrapolated to collective 
behaviour in order to inform participatory policy. Thus, along with the testing of 
effectiveness (in terms of time) of participatory against non-participatory 
groups, our final hypothesis (H4) is formulated as the follows: 
 
H4. Longer deliberation leads to more pro-heritage collective choices. 
4. Methodology and experimental design 
 
Subjects and treatments 
To collect behavioural data and observe participants’ interactions in a real 
setting, we ran a series of seven sessions at Kastoria between September and 
November 2015. Previous work highlights that group-based approaches are 
more appropriate when dealing with unfamiliar and complex questions given 
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that a group setting facilitates information sharing and deliberation (Robinson 
et al., 2008; Lienhoop & Fischer, 2009). Further, collective decision making is 
of great interest when it comes to participatory planning, given that relevant 
decisions will be made in the context of small unitary groups (Kocher & Sutter, 
2007). Thus, the sessions accommodated a total of 96 subjects that were 
organised into small groups  - normally 4 individuals per group, as is the most 
common practice in laboratory studies of voluntary contribution in public good 
games. 
Based on our hypotheses, the experiment involved the running of four 
treatments with a between-subjects design, where each subject/group was 
exposed exclusively to a single treatment. All treatments were applied to six 
groups providing a set of 24 group-observations. In particular, treatments 1 and 
2 (T1, T2) aimed to test H1 and validate our methodology by comparing data 
generated when either hypothetical payoffs (T1) or incentive-compatible 
monetary endowments (T2) were effective. Furthermore, treatments 3 and 4 
(T3, T4) were both incentive-compatible but differ in their synthesis.  
More specifically, T3 groups consisted of state-employed heritage experts 
working in the area and/or local administrators (city councils/municipal 
government). We refer to these groups as ‘non-participatory’ given that they 
reflect the conventional structure of decision-making for heritage and heritage 
tourism. In contrast, T4 groups comprised a mix (normally a 2+2 combination) 
of traditional decision-makers (state experts/administrators, as in T3) and local 
residents or entrepreneurs with no current authority and direct power to 
influence heritage tourism planning. The latter (T4) are defined as participatory 
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groups because their synthesis represents a more community-inclusive model 
for heritage tourism planning.  
Therefore, we test our remaining hypotheses (H2, H3, H4) by comparing 
collective decision-making and performance between non-participatory and 
participatory groups. We further explore the effects of community involvement 
on heritage tourism investment decisions in grass-roots formations (T2) where 
local residents and entrepreneurs act independently.  
It needs to be highlighted that apart from controlling group synthesis based 
on participants’ capacity (namely, drawing a distinction between 
experts/administrators and residents/entrepreneurs) the recruitment of subjects 
and their allocation to treatment groups remained random. Our call for 
participants was publicly advertised in mainstream local and social media and 
was open to everyone living or working in the area (convenience/random 
sampling). Invitations were also disseminated to relevant government 
bodies/representatives (quota sampling) and followed by phone or email 
correspondence to confirm attendance.  
Although these sampling techniques are susceptible to biases, in our case, 
a ‘biased’ self-selected sample was considered more realistic than problematic, 
as those interested in local heritage tourism are those who would volunteer to 
a real participatory initiative in the future. Especially for policy testing, it is not 
uncommon for experimenters to recruit participants with relevant experience or 
biases as it contributes to external validity (Dyer & Kagel, 1996). 
 
Scenarios and procedure 
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After consulting with the local branch of the state Archaeological Service, we 
designed two project scenarios. The former proposed the development of 
digital heritage trails across the area, whereas the latter suggested the 
development of a public engagement programme at the local archaeological 
museum. Both the digital trails and the museum programme were viewed as 
effective and affordable tools for promoting local heritage to visitors and interest 
groups. Our rationale for using two scenarios is that heritage tourism decisions 
can be influenced by investment-specific goals or by how a particular course of 
action might satisfy subjects’ beliefs (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010).  
For this reason, our investment scenarios carried two distinct characteristics. 
First, scenario 1 combined a series of heritage sites at various locations 
whereas the latter was focused on a single site (museum) at a particular 
location, to provoke the expression of any localism feelings (at both government 
and citizen levels). Second, the heritage trails scenario was more tourism-
oriented whereas the museum project emphasised education and identity 
values, to expose any clashing interests between different parties.  
We hold that observing behaviour in such different decision-making contexts 
enhances the robustness of our results as in real world heritage tourism 
planning involves decision-making on multiple matters. Overall, we draw our 
conclusions based on aggregate data (i.e. behaviour as expressed in both 
scenarios) although we also analyse the performance of groups as per 
treatment by distinguishing between the two scenarios.  
Based on our protocol, all sessions followed the same process where 
subjects were firstly assigned to a group and asked to complete an attitudinal 
questionnaire survey individually. The questionnaire aimed to provide us with 
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some quantitative data of subjects’ attitudinal and demographic profile. It 
comprised three sections of 5-point likert-style statements asking subjects 
about (i) their feelings for local heritage, government agents and community, 
(ii) their viewpoints of the legitimacy of various stakeholders to participate in 
heritage tourism planning, and (iii) their incentives to participate in heritage 
tourism planning. Demographic information concerned gender, age, location, 
education, occupation, and membership to community organisations.  
Once questionnaires were returned to the researchers, each group was 
allocated an endowment of 200 tokens and presented with the first scenario. 
Participants were then requested to decide collectively within their group how 
they wished to invest their endowment. The exact same process was followed 
for the second scenario after the allocation of an equal-value endowment.  
According to our experimental design, investments were made through a 
heritage/group-fund mechanism. In both scenarios, all tokens allocated to the 
heritage fund were in essence invested in the proposed project whereas tokens 
allocated to the group fund were equally shared amongst participants. Given 
that economic experiments avoid deception (Murnighan, 2015), the 
Archaeological Service was committed to undertake the projects’ 
implementation, if financed by participants. In this way, an institutional body 
was employed to safeguard that pro-heritage decisions could lead to feasible 
outcomes and provided the experiment with external validity (Croson, 2003).  
As in public good experiments, the individually optimal choice was 
contributing zero sums to the heritage account whereas the heritage/social 
optimal was contributing full sums. Based on the latter, higher contributions to 
the heritage fund reflected pro-heritage behaviour, as tokens invested in the 
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heritage project reduced the personal gains of decision-makers. These gains 
translated into real monetary rewards for all T2, T3 and T4 groups. In contrast, 
higher contributions to the group fund expressed anti-heritage behaviour given 
that groups preferred to use their endowments on other purposes.  
It should be noted that decisions could range from total pro-heritage (i.e. all 
amount to the heritage fund) to total anti-heritage (i.e. all amount to the group 
fund), with any in-between combinations being possible.  
For sessions that featured treatments with real monetary incentives (T2, T3, 
T4) a lottery system was applied once all groups had finalised their decisions 
for both scenarios. More specifically, one group/decision was randomly 
selected as winner and real payments were made privately (at a 1:1 token-euro 
exchange rate). This random selection process was employed because it 
allowed all decisions to maintain equal chances of becoming effective (thus, 
still eliciting subjects’ true behaviour) while economising study costs (Garcia-
Gallego et al., 2011; Georgantzis & Navarro-Martinez, 2010). 
Throughout the session only inter-group interaction was allowed whereas 
contributions were noted on paper and not revealed to other groups. Further, 
no time limit was imposed for finalising decisions. Rather, deliberation time, 
measured as the number of minutes passed for reaching a collective decision, 
was recorded and used as an indicator for assessing groups’ performance. This 
indicator was inspired by previous experimental studies that use time as a proxy 
to decision-making procedures (Rubinstein, 2007; 2014). 
The content of group discussions was also recorded with the view to gain a 
more complete picture of intra-group negotiations and inform the interpretation 
of quantitative data. This practice is uncommon for economic experiments and 
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there are only few studies that had used recordings in the past (e.g. Bosman et 
al., 2006; Kocher & Shutter, 2007). We followed this approach in order to study 
conflict and other qualitative features of the negotiation and decision-making 
process. 
More specifically, recordings were employed to extract individual (pursued 
or desired) contributions within groups and quantify conflict. Our first conflict 
variable (Conflict1) is estimated as the difference between the average 
individual (pursued/desired) contributions and the collective (actual) decisions, 
reflecting what behaviour prevails (anti-/pro-heritage). The second variable 
(Conflict2) is the standard deviation of individual decisions and quantifies the 
level of intra-group disagreement. Furthermore, qualitative information 
provided by recorded discussions helped us analyse group dynamics when 
conflict arises. 
 
Questionnaire data  
Although traditional economic theory oversimplifies individuals’ behaviour as 
one purely dictated by self-interest, there are admittedly other motives that drive 
economic choices. Indeed, there is vast experimental work, which illustrates 
that when faced with economic decisions, subjects frequently exhibit social 
preferences by choosing options that do not maximize their own monetary 
payoffs (Brandts & Fatas, 2012).  
Given that in our case social preferences translate into contributions to the 
heritage fund, it is worth exploring whether there are specific drivers relating to 
subjects’ profile or ideological background that influence individual choices. 
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Most importantly, it is interesting to investigate whether intra-group dissimilarity 
across these factors affects collective decisions. 
Thus, we combine questionnaire data with experimental results and perform 
regression analysis, where individual contributions to heritage are set as the 
dependent variable whereas attitudinal and demographic questionnaire 
variables are used as predictors of subjects’ behaviour during the experiment 
(Table 1).  
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
The regression model is shown in Equation 1: 
𝐼𝐶𝑗 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑖𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖𝑳𝑬𝑮𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖𝑴𝑶𝑻𝑗 + 𝜁𝑖𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗 , (1) 
 
where, 𝐼𝐶𝑗  denotes the individual contributions of subject 𝑗 to heritage fund, 
𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑗 , 𝑳𝑬𝑮𝑗 , 𝑴𝑶𝑻𝑗  and 𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑗  are the vectors of the attitudinal (sentimental, 
legitimacy, motivational) and demographic characteristics of subject 𝑗 and 𝛽𝑖, 
𝛾𝑖, 𝛿𝑖 and 𝜁𝑖 are coefficients to be estimated. Finally, 𝑒𝑗 denotes the error term. 
Finally, we explore how dissimilarity of the above factors amongst the 
members of a group influences collective (actual) contributions to heritage. 
More specifically, similar to Miner (1984) and Pelled (1996) who examine group 
behaviour based on individuals’ traits, we measure intra-group dissimilarity by 
averaging the summed absolute differences among all subjects of a group, as 
shown in Equation 2. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠_𝑐𝑔 =  
1
𝑛
∑|𝑐𝑗 − 𝑐𝑘|
𝑛
𝑗=1
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, (2) 
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where,  𝐷𝑖𝑠_𝑐𝑔 denotes the dissimilarity score of characteristic 𝑐 and group 𝑔 
and 𝑐𝑗 is the value of the individual characteristic of subject 𝑗 and 𝑐𝑘 is the value 
of the same characteristic for every other subject of the same group.  
Again, we perform regression analysis, where intra-group dissimilarity 
variables are set as predictors of collective contributions (Equation 3):  
𝐺𝐶𝑔 = 𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑔 + 𝜑𝑖𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑳𝑬𝑮𝑔 + 𝜔𝑖𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑴𝑶𝑻𝑔 + 𝜉𝑖𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑔
+ 𝑒𝑔, 
(3) 
 
where, 𝐺𝐶𝑔 denotes the collective contributions of group 𝑔 to heritage fund and 
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑔 , 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑳𝑬𝑮𝑔 , 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑴𝑶𝑻𝑔  and 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑔  are the vectors of the 
dissimilarity scores for each of the sentimental, legitimacy and motivational and 
demographic elements of group 𝑔.   𝜃𝑖 , 𝜑𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖  and 𝜉𝑖  are coefficients to be 
estimated and 𝑒𝑔 denotes the error term. 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Group synthesis and behaviour 
Table 2 provides a general overview of group characteristics along with the 
mean values of contributions to the heritage fund, deliberation time to reach a 
decision and intra-group conflict across all treatments. We observe that in both 
scenarios T1 groups invest slightly more to heritage than T2 groups, although 
the most striking differences are found in deliberation and conflict. Further, in 
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the first scenario, T3 and T4 groups exhibit a similar pro-heritage behaviour 
whereas in the second round the latter are more generous. The average 
number of minutes spent to reach a collective decision is little higher for T4 
groups whereas conflict values are much greater for T4 compared to T3. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
To compare groups’ behaviour (mean values) based on their synthesis in 
greater detail, we ran a series of non-parametric (Mann Whitney) tests. Starting 
from a comparison between T1 and T2 treatments, Table 3 (Panel A) shows 
that independently of the scenario, these groups do not exhibit any statistically 
significant differences in terms of their contributions. However, T2 groups spent 
significantly more time to reach a decision in both scenarios (p=0.006 and 
p=0.043, respectively) suggesting that final contributions are more 
contemplative (Rubinstein, 2014). In scenario 1, the two treatment groups also 
exhibit significant differences in terms of conflict (p=0.045 for Conflict1 and 
p=0.049 for Conflict2), with T2 groups appearing more susceptible to dispute. 
The differences in time and conflict maintain their significance when 
considering aggregate values of both scenarios (Table 3, Panel B).  
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Thus, there is evidence that the application of real rewards affected subjects’ 
behaviour as it induced longer deliberation times and greater conflict, providing 
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support to H1. Given these results, T1 groups are excluded from the rest of our 
analysis.  
Moving to the effects of participation, we find that contributions to heritage 
and deliberation times between T3 and T4 groups exhibit no statistically 
significant differences. These findings confirm H2, revealing that community 
involvement in decision-making can be as effective (time-wise) as top-down 
decision-making and can lead to actions that are equally favourable to heritage 
investment.  
Furthermore, the two conflict variables illustrate that T4 groups are 
characterised by a higher tendency to conflict (the significance of Conflict1 is at 
p=0.056 for both scenarios whereas Conflict2 is significant with p=0.092 in the 
first scenario). However, it is of great importance that despite higher dispute for 
participatory (T4) groups, opposing viewpoints do not encourage T4 groups to 
exhibit a more selfish behaviour. Linking these results to H3, we thus observe 
that participatory groups are indeed more prone to conflict, but this behaviour 
does not translate into less pro-heritage choices. 
We further our analysis by comparing the behaviour of grass-roots groups 
(T2) against the other two treatments (T3, T4). We find that in terms of time and 
conflict, the performance of T2 and T4 groups is similar. The only exemption is 
found in the first scenario where contributions to heritage are significantly lower 
across T2 groups (p=0.058).  
In addition, the comparison between grass-roots (T2) and non-participatory 
(T3) groups illuminates in the first round a different behaviour across all 
dimensions (i.e. contributions, time, and conflict variables), with T2 groups 
making more anti-heritage decisions, being less effective (in terms of higher 
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deliberation times) and more prone to conflict. However, when we run the tests 
with total results only Time and Conflict1 persists (Table 3, Panel B). 
 
Deliberation and conflict 
As shown on Table 4, the average individual (desired) contributions do 
occasionally exhibit differences with the final (actual) collective decisions of the 
groups. As explained in Section 3.4, we define these occasions as conflictual 
given that intra-group opinions are differentiated.  
It is important to note that in their vast majority, conflicting opinions in terms 
of contributions to the heritage fund led groups to more pro-heritage behaviour. 
There are only a couple of cases where conflict arose and collective decisions 
were lower than the average individual contributions. These two cases 
correspond to T2G4 and T3G1 (grass-roots and non-participatory groups, 
respectively). In contrast, in all participatory groups pro-heritage behaviour is 
evident whereas these groups made the highest total contributions. Overall, our 
study results witness the predominance of social rationality (Vatn, 2009) and of 
the heritage communal values over individual ones when the participatory 
treatment was run. This is another evidence in favour of H2 and against H3. 
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
We extend this analysis by investigating the correlations between 
contributions, deliberation and conflict, using the Spearman correlation test 
(Table 5). We observe that apart from T3, all variables are positively correlated 
among them. A positive correlation between Time and Conflict is not surprising 
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given that a dispute is likely to extend discussion length and decelerate final 
decisions. More interesting though is the positive correlation between 
Contributions and Conflict, indicating that when dispute arouses pro-heritage 
decisions eventually prevail.  
 
[TABLE 5] 
 
Furthermore, the positive correlations between contributions and time 
suggest that longer deliberation in collective/social settings does lead to pro-
heritage (i.e. pro-social) decisions, as suggested by Rubinstein (2007) and 
Piovesan and Wengstrom (2009) for individual choices (i.e. we offer support to 
H4). We should highlight though that these findings hold only for T2 and T4 
groups. On the contrary, findings concerning T3 lead us to reject H4 as the 
correlations between Time and Contributions, as well as, between Time and 
Conflict are negative.  
Overall, Table 5 provides a very interesting observation that conflict in 
participatory groups is actually constructive, strengthening the argument in 
favour of utilising community participation in heritage planning.  
 
Subjects’ idiosyncrasy and dissimilarity effects 
Having documented the importance of participatory decision-making, we 
continue our analysis by investigating the drivers of individual (desired) 
contributions to heritage (see Equation 1) and subsequently how factors’ 
dissimilarity among group members might impact collective decisions (see 
Equation 3). It should be noted that in the latter estimations, due to small 
 27 
sample size, regressions were ran separately among the four variable 
categories. The results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
As illustrated in Table 6, our findings suggest that individual contributions 
(IC) by T2, T3 and T4 subjects during the experimental session are influenced 
positively by community trust and by acknowledging the conservation and 
promotion of local heritage as a priority issue. Furthermore, willingness to pay 
through personal income (WTP2) has a negative effect on desired contributions 
to the heritage fund. This is a rather unexpected result (the opposite effect 
would be anticipated) but it might indicate behavioural differences against a 
hypothetical question and an actual monetary decision. 
 
[TABLE 6] 
 
Moving to factors concerning stakeholders’ legitimacy, we observe that trust 
towards the local Archaeological Service affects contributions positively. Such 
finding is plausible given that heritage contributions are in essence allocated to 
this specific body. The reverse effect is observed for trust to central governance 
and freelance heritage experts, illuminating the competing roles amongst 
different expert parties.  
From the rest of the variables considered, we find that the highest the 
importance assigned to special training as a prerequisite for participation in 
heritage tourism planning, the lowest the IC. Such relationship might signal a 
sense of alienation in terms of community’s felt legitimacy and personal 
responsibility to heritage tourism planning, which in turn discourages pro-
heritage choices. In addition, location plays a negative role in desired 
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contributions, as remoteness from places of heritage tourism interest is likely to 
minimise expected benefits. 
However, as our interest is focused on participatory heritage tourism 
planning, we repeat the same analysis restricting the sample to subjects from 
the wider community (i.e. local residents and entrepreneurs). Compared to the 
full sample estimation, we find that the individual contributions of community 
(ICC) are impacted by several additional drivers.  
More specifically, ICC is affected in a positive manner by institutional trust, 
WTP1, and the involvement of tour operators and local organisations to 
heritage management. At the same time, it is found that monetary gains and 
the existence of a collaborative spirit as incentives for participation to heritage 
tourism planning discourage contributions. Demographic-wise, we observe that 
females are less generous to heritage. Further, higher education appears to 
have a negative effect on ICC but the opposite holds for current involvement in 
community organisations. 
[TABLE 7] 
 
The final part of our regression analysis focuses on how intra-group 
dissimilarity of the above factors might influence collective decisions. As 
illustrated in Table 7, dissimilarity of attitudinal factors concerning stakeholders’ 
legitimacy to participate and dissimilarity of demographic characteristics exert 
a significant influence on the collective contributions of the group (GC).  
In particular, GC were higher when dissimilarity of opinions was higher with 
regards to the legitimacy of the central and municipal government and the role 
of tour operators, heritage freelancers and local community-led organisations 
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in heritage tourism planning. Moreover, higher male presence in the group 
composition and dissimilarities in terms of occupation amongst group members 
also influenced GC positively. These contrasts with dissimilarities found for trust 
towards the Archaeological Service and the role of consultants and tourism 
professionals, which played a negative role on collective choices as did the 
dissimilarity of subjects’ involvement in community organisations.  
Overall, although we document that conflict is constructive for heritage, i.e. 
allows pro-heritage preferences to prevail in collective decisions, we maintain 
that not all sources of dissimilarity are beneficial to heritage. This is suggestive 
of the fact that when it comes to collective decisions, barriers to pro-heritage 
behaviour should be addressed thoroughly. However, it is important to consider 
dissimilarity along with group synthesis. Table 8 focuses on the eleven (11) 
variables that influence GC (Table 7) significantly and shows the average 
dissimilarities across the three treatments.  
[TABLE 8] 
 
In seven of these variables where the coefficient is positive, the treatment 
group with the highest average dissimilarity score is preferred, as higher 
dissimilarity favours contributions to heritage. By contrast in the four variables 
that have a negative coefficient, the opposite is favoured. Interestingly, 
participatory treatment groups (T4) exhibit the largest number of preferred 
dissimilarity scores. This especially holds for the variables that had a negative 
coefficient in Table 7. Such finding strengthens our argument that participatory 
decision-making provides a fertile ground for heritage tourism planning. 
 
 30 
Further analysis on conflict and group dynamics 
As a final step of our analysis it is valuable to focus on the recordings of the 
discussions that took place within the different groups and treatments in their 
effort to reach to their collective decision. Recordings assist us to gain a deeper 
understanding of how intra-group conflict played and negotiated during 
deliberation to identify the conditions that favoured the prevalence of social 
rationality.  
Based on Rahim (2001) and Thomas (1992), we define four approaches to 
negotiating conflict. These are (i) the contending approach, where subjects 
show interest primarily for their own outcomes, (ii) the accommodating 
approach, where concern is higher for others, (iii) the collaborative approach, 
where interest is balanced between own and others’ needs and (iv) the avoiding 
approach where concern is low for both sides. Qualitative results are presented 
in Table 9.   
 
[TABLE 9] 
 
In general, we observe that when collaborative behaviour prevailed, conflict 
resolution leaned towards pro-heritage decisions (e.g. T2G2, T4G6 on 
Scenario 1 and T2G1, T4G5 on Scenario 2). By contrast, when contending 
voices were the majority, groups were led towards anti-heritage decisions (e.g. 
T2G4, T3G1 in Scenario 2). It is important to highlight that this behaviour was 
only observed in either grass-roots (T2) or non-participatory (T3) groups. In 
addition, contending behaviour expressed by the minority of a group (which is 
mainly found for participatory groups) had not an anti-heritage effect on 
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collective decisions (e.g. T4G3 in Scenario 1 and 2). Again, these findings 
suggest that participatory decision-making can function as an effective 
mechanism for heritage tourism planning.  
It is also worth noting that our recordings (although not shown here due to 
data sensitivity issues) illuminate occasions where anti-heritage choices 
express what Lowenthal (2015) defines as a clash between the benefits of the 
past (cultural) and the benefits of the present (social, economic). In other words, 
there were occasions where anti-heritage decisions hindered a prioritisation of 
other communal causes over promoting cultural heritage. Yet, although not all 
anti-heritage decisions were necessarily anti-social, they undermined the future 
of heritage tourism in the area. 
Another element that drew our attention was the level of democracy (i.e. the 
degree of participation amongst group members) and the quality of deliberation. 
Our impression from recordings data (once again these are not shown here) is 
that social pressures were present across all treatments and led occasionally 
to conformity where consensus was reached without much consideration of 
alternative choices. Perhaps expectedly, groups comprised members of equal 
status or similar profile followed a much more democratic/balanced process of 
making their decision.  
Finally, it needs to be highlighted that in participatory groups anti-heritage 
behaviour and conflict originated by either experts/administrators or community 
representatives alike. However, as we established in either case the balancing 
of preferences leant towards the heritage side. We further discover here that 
when the participatory treatment (T4) was run, subjects drove pro-heritage 
choices, irrespectively of their capacity. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
Tourism is viewed as a driver of economic growth whereas special interest 
tourism choices, such as heritage tourism present opportunities for the 
development of deprived rural areas. A review of the relevant literature 
illuminates a growing consensus that a sustainable heritage tourism strategy 
requires a cultural change in terms of policy-making, assigning destination 
communities an active role in planning and decision-making. Yet, such 
proposition of power sharing is rather radical and the limited empirical evidence 
demonstrating its benefits convincingly remains its Achilles’ heel. 
This paper attempts to address this issue by exploring and directly 
comparing decision-making with and without community participation for the 
first time. Taking into consideration the complications of collecting relevant 
empirical data, the study proposes a new methodological approach that departs 
from the current literature. More specifically, it employs a novel quasi-field 
experimental protocol, similar to that of public goods, to observe behaviour and 
obtain data on stakeholders’ views in a participatory social setting that allows 
eliciting group dynamics and interactions amongst subjects. This methodology 
can thus complement current research tools by testing theory and conducting 
an ex-ante and comparative analysis of community participation.  
In order to be relevant and timely, the study is located to Kastoria, Greece, 
an area with inherent challenges due to its economic structure, heritage capital 
and policy culture. The social interaction space staged during the experiment 
exposed subjects to investment decisions concerning local heritage tourism. 
Through the formulation of non-participatory, grass-roots and participatory 
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groups we examine whether decision-making favours investments in specific 
heritage goods/scenarios. Once presented with the two project scenarios, the 
subjects had the opportunity to discuss each other’s positions, share their 
knowledge and debate over what was the preferable course of action.  
The study employs both hypothetical and incentive-compatible payoffs, 
meaning that the money invested in the heritage projects reduces the actual 
personal monetary gains of decision makers. Our behavioural data suggests 
that contributions to heritage made by treatment groups in which choices were 
not responsive to actual gains did not differ dramatically compared to incentive 
compatible results. Although such finding is not fully compliant with 
experimental literature, similar findings have been reported in the past 
(Rubinstein, 2007). Still, our data demonstrates that incentive-compatible 
rewards increased decision-making time and conflict considerably. 
We find that although participatory groups made the highest total 
contributions to the heritage projects compared to all other treatments, these 
contributions are not statistically different from the participatory groups. Higher 
contributions to heritage as opposed to own signify a willingness to cooperate 
on behalf of participatory groups members in providing the public good into 
question. We further observe that the deliberation times between participatory 
and non-participatory groups are also not significantly different. More 
importantly, even though we find that participatory groups were more 
susceptible to conflict, dispute did not drive their decisions towards anti-
heritage choices but rather played a constructive role. 
Our findings also illuminate a positive correlation among time, conflict and 
pro-heritage decisions at both participatory and grassroots groups, whereas 
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correlations are negative for non-participatory groups. The positive correlation 
between contributions and time implies that longer deliberation in social 
settings leads to pro-heritage choices. Again, the positive correlation between 
conflict and pro-heritage decisions suggests that dispute is not destructive in 
participatory heritage planning. 
In terms of the factors that influence individual preferences, we find that 
desired contributions to heritage goods (full sample) are influenced positively 
by high community trust, prioritising local heritage and assigning high credibility 
to the Archaeological Service. Community respondents are also driven 
positively by high institutional trust (instead of community trust), high 
willingness to pay for heritage and acknowledging high legitimacy to community 
organisations as participants to heritage tourism planning. In addition, 
membership to community organisations also raises contributions. From the 
negative factors, the most interesting is location, evident in both samples, 
suggesting a positive relationship between pro-heritage preferences and 
proximity to places of heritage tourism interest. 
Finally, our analysis reveals that intra-group (dissimilarity?) heterogeneity of 
the above factors influences collective decisions mainly positively. Across the 
remaining variables that have negative effects, for almost all, participatory 
groups exhibit the lowest average dissimilarity scores, implying a higher 
immunity to disagreement as a source of anti-heritage behaviour compared to 
other treatment groups. In addition, recordings data illuminate that when conflict 
arose in participatory groups, the negotiating behaviour of the majority was 
collaborative and led to pro-heritage choices. In other group formations, when 
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contending behaviour was prevalent, it favoured decisions that were less pro-
heritage than group’s average desired contributions. 
Our results have important implications given that community participation is 
widely seen in tourism and development studies as a means of improving the 
quality, legitimacy and sustainability of heritage tourism strategies. The fact that 
an economically deprived community with no participatory experience, as the 
one studied here, is willing to take on an active role in decision-making is very 
encouraging as it is its acknowledgement of heritage as a public good with 
potential for communal impacts.  
Although these findings are place and time specific, they still indicate that 
decision-making could indeed depart from conventional approaches to heritage 
tourism planning towards a more inclusive mixed structure. The latter needs to 
encourage collaboration between experts, government agencies and non-
governmental groups (e.g. residents, local community organisations, tourism 
professionals) instead of promoting the dichotomies between top-down and 
bottom-up models. Moreover, we observe that conflict and dissimilarity of 
opinions are not destructive but rather constructive to heritage decisions. This 
is a critical finding that could reduce hesitation and anxiety on behalf of heritage 
professionals and other authorities towards power sharing, as despite 
community involvement giving rise to more conflict, this does not act as an 
inhibitor to pro-heritage choices. 
Overall, it is argued that the use of experimental economics methods offers 
the possibility of studying otherwise difficult to capture phenomena, such as 
negotiation and collective decision making processes in a controlled 
environment, appropriate for the juxtaposition and comparison of alternatives 
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and counterfactuals. Thus, future research could further employ experimental 
approaches to examine community involvement in other context or explore 
other dimensions of collective behaviour, such as the content of decision-
making procedure, intra-group dynamics and negotiation mechanisms.  
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Table 1. List of variables 
Name Description Measurement 
Individual Contributions 
(IC) 
Pursued/desired contribution to the 
heritage fund 
Experimental 
Units (0-400) 
Sentiment Factors (SEN) 
Attachment to heritage Sentimental attachment to local heritage Ratings from 
1-5 where 1 
expresses 
lowest and 5 
highest levels 
Responsibility to protect 
heritage 
Feeling of personal stewardship towards 
local heritage 
Institutional Trust Trust towards local authorities for 
heritage tourism issues 
Community Trust Trust towards co-citizens and partnering 
for the delivery of communal gains 
Heritage as priority issue Belief that protection/management of 
heritage should be a top priority of local 
policy 
WTP1  Willingness to pay for heritage through 
taxes 
WTP2 Willingness to pay for heritage through 
personal income 
Legitimacy factors (LEG) 
 45 
Central government Acknowledging this stakeholder as a 
legitimate participant in local heritage 
tourism planning 
Ratings from 
1-5 where 1 
expresses 
lowest and 5 
highest levels 
of acceptance 
Regional government Same as above 
City councils Same as above 
Local Archaeological 
Service 
Same as above 
Consultants-specialists Same as above 
Tour operators Same as above 
Freelance heritage 
experts 
Same as above 
Tourism professionals Same as above 
Local community 
organisations 
Same as above 
Local residents Same as above 
Motivational factors (MOT) 
Monetary gains Opportunities to increase personal 
profits influence willingness to 
participate 
Ratings from 
1-5 where 1 
expresses 
lowest and 5 
highest 
influence 
Professional development Opportunities to develop professional 
skills/experience influence willingness to 
participate 
Not time-demanding Investing too much time influences 
willingness to participate  
Receiving special training Training as mandatory to participation 
influences willingness to participate  
True collaborative spirit Collaborative behaviour of others 
influences willingness to participate 
Demographic factors (DEM) 
Gender Males; Females  Dummy 0 
(Male), 1 
(Female) 
Age 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+ Scores from 1 
(18-24) to 6 
(65+) 
Location Most to least central locations of 
heritage tourism interest  
Scores from 1 
(highest 
proximity) to 3 
(lowest 
proximity) 
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Education High school diploma or lower; university 
graduate degree, post-graduate degree 
Scores from 1 
(lowest) to 3 
(highest 
education 
level) 
Relevant Occupation Profession relevant to heritage and/or 
tourism 
Dummy 0 
(No),1 (Yes) 
Formal community 
involvement  
Membership to a local community 
organisation 
Dummy 0 
(No),1 (Yes) 
Note: All values are based on questionnaire responses, apart from individual contributions (IC), 
which were extracted from experiment recordings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of group syntheses and collected data. 
  Treatment 
  T1 T2 T3 T4 
Groups (N) 6 6 6 6 
Subjects (N) 24 24 20 28 
Real endowments No Yes Yes Yes 
Avg. Admins per group (%) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 
Avg. Males per group (%) 0.29 0.63 0.33 0.41 
Age1 (median) 4.5 3.0 3.0 4.0 
Education2 (median) 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Location3 (median) 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 
Avg. Contributions (ExU)      
Sc1 160.00 141.67 200.00 191.67 
Sc2 166.67 125.00 125.00 176.67 
Avg. Time (Mins)       
Sc1 8.17 20.00 8.67 13.83 
Sc2 6.17 11.17 7.00 10.33 
Avg. Conflict14      
Sc1 -3.33 16.67 0.00 20.00 
Sc2 0.00 2.08 -11.11 13.33 
Avg. Conflict25      
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Sc1 6.67 40.14 0.00 44.72 
Sc2 0.00 12.5 19.25 44.72 
     
Notes:  
1: Age is coded as 1:18-24, 2:25-34, 3:35-44, 4:45-54, 5:55-64,6:65-74.  
2: Education is coded as 1: High school graduate, 2: University graduate, 3: Post-graduate. 
3: Location is coded 1-3 starting from Kastoria’s city core and moving towards peripheral 
areas. 
4: Conflict1 is estimated as the difference between individual desired contributions (mean 
values) and group actual contributions. 
5: Conflict2 is the standard deviation of individual desired contributions of group members. 
ExU: Experimental Units; Sc1: Scenario 1; Sc2: Scenario 2; Mins: Minutes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Inter-treatment comparisons for scenarios 1, 2 and total 
Panel A: Scenarios 1 and 2 
Treatment Contributions Time Conflict1 Conflict2 
 Sc1 Sc2 Sc1 Sc2 Sc1 Sc2 Sc1 Sc2 
 T1vsT2 -0.821 -0.717 -2.766*** -2.023** -2.006** 0.000 -1.968** -1.477 
T3vsT4 -1.000 -1.378 -1.470 -0.890 -1.915* -1.687* -1.915* -0.866 
T2vsT4 -1.896* -0.895 -0.723 -0.563 -0.259 -1.146 0.000 -1.081 
T2vsT3 -2.309** -0.252 -2.531** -1.615 -1.897* -0.631 -2.292** -0.420 
T2vsT4 -1.896* -0.895 -0.723 -0.563 -0.259 -1.146 0.000 -1.081 
Panel B: Total  
Treatment Tot_Contributions Tot_Time Tot_Conflict1 Tot_Conflict2 
 T1vsT2 -0.490 -2.486*** -2.326** -1.964* 
T3vsT4 -1.199         -1.549          -2.006*         -1.614 
T2vsT4 -1.459         -0.722          -0.333         -0.982 
T2vsT3 -0.574         -2.096** -2.326**         -1.250 
T2vsT4 -1.459         -0.722          -0.333         -0.982 
Notes: Values represent z-statistic of the Mann-Whitney test. 
Conflict1 is estimated as the difference between individual desired contributions (mean values) and group 
actual contributions. 
Conflict2 is the standard deviation of individual desired contributions of group members. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Individual/group contributions per group 
 Scenario 1  Scenario 2               Total 
 IC GC  IC GC  IC    GC 
T2 
150.00 150.00  175.00 200.00  325.00 350.00 
175.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  375.00 400.00 
150.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  350.00 400.00 
75.00 100.00  162.50 150.00  237.50 250.00 
100.00 100.00  0.00 0.00  100.00 100.00 
100.00 100.00  0.00 0.00  100.00 100.00 
T2 Mean 125.00 141.67  122.92 125.00  247.92 266.67 
T3 
200.00 200.00  66.67 0.00  266.67 200.00 
200.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  400.00 400.00 
200.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  400.00 400.00 
200.00 200.00  100.00 100.00  300.00 300.00 
200.00 200.00  150.00 150.00  350.00 350.00 
200.00 200.00  100.00 100.00  300.00 300.00 
T3 Mean 200.00 200.00  136.11 125.00  336.11 325.00 
T4 
160.00 200.00  160.00 200.00  320.00 400.00 
150.00 150.00  100.00 100.00  250.00 250.00 
160.00 200.00  160.00 200.00  320.00 400.00 
200.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  400.00 400.00 
200.00 200.00  160.00 160.00  360.00 360.00 
160.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  360.00 400.00 
T4 Mean 171.67 191.67  163.33 176.67 
 
335.00   368.33 
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Note: IC: Average Individual (desired) contributions. GC: Group (actual) contributions. Values reflect 
experimental units. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Correlations between total contributions, time and conflict (Spearman's rho) 
 Tot_Contributions Tot_Time Tot_Conflict1 Tot_Conflict2 
 T2 Groups 
Tot_Contributions 1.000    
Tot_Time 0.471 1.000   
Tot_Conflict1 0.955 0.441 1.000  
Tot_Conflict2 0.746 0.406 0.896 1.000 
 T3 Groups 
Tot_Contributions 1.000    
Tot_Time -0.750 1.000   
Tot_Conflict1 0.674 -0.696 1.000  
Tot_Conflict2 0.696 -0.674 -1.000 1.000 
 T4 Groups 
Tot_Contributions 1.000    
Tot_Time 0.439 1.000   
Tot_Conflict1 0.657 0.926 1.000  
Tot_Conflict2 0.495 0.956 0.904 1.000 
Notes:  
Tot_Conflict1 is estimated as the difference between individual desired contributions (mean values) 
and group actual contributions. 
Tot_Conflict2 is the standard deviation of individual desired contributions of group members. 
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Table 6. Factors driving individual (desired) contributions. This table presents the 
results of Equation 1 (𝐼𝐶𝑗 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑖𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖𝑳𝑬𝑮𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖𝑴𝑶𝑻𝑗 + 𝜁𝑖𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗) 
 IC ICC 
Constant 133.367 331.849 
Sentiment factors  
Attachment to heritage 24.954 -35.477 
Responsibility to protect heritage -1.181 -20.929 
Institutional Trust 8.770 40.989** 
Community Trust 53.087** 38.335 
Heritage as priority issue 45.482** 82.956*** 
WTP1 (taxes) 37.751 66.736* 
WTP2 (income) -38.617* -56.143*** 
Legitimacy factors 
Central government -36.248* -80.378*** 
Municipal government 19.162 -18.636 
City councils -6.387 -4.512 
Local Archaeological Service 64.832** 100.753*** 
Consultants-specialists -3.432 -16.645 
Tour operators 0.551 62.152*** 
Freelance heritage experts -49.410** -88.259** 
Tourism professionals 7.043 19.325 
Local community organisations 10.653 100.638*** 
Local residents -1.733 -30.799 
Motivational factors 
Monetary gains -7.360 -48.900*** 
Professional development -11.224 -21.074 
Not time-demanding  -0.679 -26.189 
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Receiving special training -71.937** 49.018 
True collaborative spirit 28.127 -58.438** 
Demographic factors 
Gender -29.954 -81.334*** 
Age -7.838 14.493 
Location -67.392* -84.429*** 
Education 12.654 -70.809** 
Relevant Occupation -5.843 35.074 
Current involvement  -14.320 100.552** 
   
R-squared 0.458 0.796 
Notes: Estimations are based on aggregate contributions based on both scenarios.  
IC: Individual Contributions to heritage fund (full sample) 
ICC: Individual Contributions to heritage fund (community sample). 
* , **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Intra-group dissimilarity effects on collective (group) contributions. This table 
presents the results of Equation 3 (𝐺𝐶𝑔 = 𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑺𝑬𝑵𝑔 + 𝜑𝑖𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑳𝑬𝑮𝑔 + 𝜔𝑖𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑴𝑶𝑻𝑔 +
𝜉𝑖𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑔 + 𝑒𝑔) 
 GC GC GC GC 
Constant 149.631 239.955*** 250.590*** 245.453** 
Sentiment factors 
Attachment to heritage 61.040    
Responsibility to protect heritage 36.892    
Institutional Trust 97.406    
Community Trust -38.645    
Heritage as priority issue 18.265    
WTP1 (taxes) -58.792    
WTP2 (personal income) 52.047    
Legitimacy factors 
Central government  103.600*   
Municipal government  143.626*   
City councils  -30.238   
Local Archaeological Service  -153.179**   
Consultants-specialists  -134.633**   
Tour operators   141.566**   
Freelance heritage experts  182.573**   
Tourism professionals   -222.141***   
Local community organisations  131.114***   
Local residents  -55.282   
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Motivational factors 
Monetary gains   -32.151  
Professional development   -10.893  
Not time-demanding    45.507  
Receiving special training   27.374  
True collaborative spirit   139.707  
Demographic Factors 
Gender    219.140** 
Age    -28.553 
Location    -133.600 
Education    26.381 
Relevant Occupation    226.024* 
Current involvement     -192.077** 
IDC     
Time    -0.608 
    4.003 
Group dummies YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.554 0.907 0.312 0.623 
Notes: Estimations are based on aggregate values based on both scenarios. 
GC: collective (group) contributions to the heritage fund. 
* , **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 8. Average dissimilarity scores for the significant variables of Table 6 
Dissimilarity variable T2 T3 T4 
Positive coefficients 
Central government 0.973 1.083 0.667 
Municipal government 1.307 0.517 0.623 
Tour operators 1.167 1.583 1.123 
Freelance heritage experts 0.473 0.817 1.212 
Local community organisations 0.807 0.550 0.623 
Gender 0.250 0.317 0.447 
Relevant Occupation 0.167 0.513 0.000 
Negative coefficients 
Local Archaeological Service 1.028 0.500 0.335 
Consultants-specialists 0.917 1.295 0.312 
Tourism professionals 1.197 0.895 1.547 
Current involvement  0.473 0.378 0.223 
Note: Bold denotes best result. The best results for the variables with positive 
(negative) coefficients are those with the highest (lowest) average dissimilarity 
scores. 
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Table 9. Behaviour towards conflict 
 Source Behaviour IC GC 
Scenario 1 
T2G1 Institutional mistrust 
Majority: Collaborative 
Minority: Accommodating 
150.00 150.00 
T2G2 Institutional mistrust 
Majority: Collaborative 
Minority: Collaborative 
175.00 200.00 
T2G3 Project quality 
Majority: Collaborative 
Minority: Accommodating 
150.00 200.00 
T2G4 Local dispute 
Majority: Collaborative 
Minority: Contending 
75.00 100.00 
T4G1 Power clash 
Majority: Avoidance 
Minority: Contending 
160.00 200.00 
T4G3 Personal agendas 
Majority: Collaborative 
Minority: Contending 
160.00 200.00 
T4G6 Project quality 
Majority: Collaborative 
Minority: Accommodating 
160.00 200.00 
Scenario 2 
T2G1 Institutional mistrust 
Majority: Collaborative 
Minority: Contending 
175.00 200.00 
T2G4 Personal agendas 
Majority: Contending 
Minority: Collaborative 
162.50 150.00 
T3G1 Personal agendas 
Majority: Contending 
Minority: Accommodating 
66.67 0.00 
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T4G1 Power clash 
Majority: Avoidance 
Minority: Contending 
160.00 200.00 
T4G3 Personal agendas 
Majority: Collaborative 
Minority: Contending 
160.00 200.00 
T4G5 Power clash 
Majority: Collaborative 
Minority: Contending 
160.00 160.00 
Notes:  
IC: Individual (desired) contributions to heritage fund (mean) 
GC: Group (actual) contributions to heritage fund 
 
 
